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Comparing Wayfair and Wynne:
Lessons for the Future of the Dormant
Commerce Clause
Edward A. Zelinsky
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article compares the Supreme Court’s dormant
Commerce Clause decisions in South Dakota v. Wayfair1 and
Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne.2 Wayfair and
Wynne are both as important, as they were narrowly-decided.
Despite (perhaps because of) their differences, they together tell
us much about the current Court’s divisions under the dormant
Commerce Clause and about the future of the dormant
Commerce Clause.
A comparison of Wayfair and Wynne indicates that the prospect
of the Court jettisoning the dormant Commerce Clause altogether is
unlikely. However, the Justices who would abandon the dormant
Commerce Clause can exercise decisive influence in particular cases
as they did in Wayfair.3 The current Court’s dormant Commerce
Clause skeptics—Justices Thomas and Gorsuch—provided the
crucial fourth and fifth votes in Wayfair to overturn Quill.4
It will continue to be rare for the Court to reverse its own
dormant Commerce Clause decisions. Far from opening the
floodgates, Wayfair indicates that the Court is reluctant to overrule
its dormant Commerce Clause cases in light of Congress’s ultimate
constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. However,
when neither the Court nor Congress has spoken on a particular
issue, the Court will consider extending the dormant Commerce
Clause as it did in Wynne.5
Going forward, an important issue under the dormant
Commerce Clause will be the double taxation which results when
Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law of Yeshiva University. For helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article, I
thank Professors Brannon P. Denning, Daniel Hemel, and Mitchell Engler.
1 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
2 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
3 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087.
4 Id.
5 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794.
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an individual is deemed to be a resident for tax purposes, by two
states, each of which taxes all of the dual resident’s income. Wayfair
and Wynne suggest that, despite the compelling arguments against
the double state taxation of dual residents’ incomes, the Court will
be reluctant to set aside its precedents upholding the double state
taxation of dual residents.6
Instead, the Court is more likely to extend dormant
Commerce Clause protection when states are overly aggressive in
taxing the income of nonresidents. In particular, the Court is more
likely to apply the dormant Commerce Clause apportionment
principle to curb New York’s “convenience of the employer”
doctrine to avoid New York’s double state income taxation of
telecommuters on the days they work at their out-of-state homes.7
II. WAYFAIR
By a 5-4 vote, Wayfair overturned Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota8 as “unsound and incorrect.”9 In 1992, Quill confirmed
the dormant Commerce Clause rule that a state could impose
sales tax collection responsibilities on a retailer only if the
retailer had a physical presence in the taxing state.10 This
physical presence rule had first been announced in National
Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue in 1967.11 Quill and Bellas
Hess were decided before the rise of the Internet and electronic
commerce. These decisions severely limited the states’ abilities to
enforce their respective sales taxes on internet purchases by
precluding the states from imposing sales tax collection duties on
out-of-state internet and mail-order retailers.12
In Wayfair, Justice Kennedy advanced three basic themes for
overturning Quill and thereby abolishing the physical presence
rule.13 The first of these Wayfair themes was the historic legitimacy
of the dormant Commerce Clause which “imposes limitations on the
States absent congressional action.”14 A second theme of Wayfair
was the flaws of Quill and of the physical presence rule15 which
See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2080; Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1787.
See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, New York’s “Convenience of the Employer” Rule
is Unconstitutional, 48 ST. TAX NOTES 553 (2008).
8 504 U.S. 298 (1992), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
9 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
10 See id. at 314.
11 86 U.S. 753 (1967), confirmed by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992),
and overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
12 For further background on these limitations, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Political
Process Argument for Overruling Quill, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1180–84 (2017) and Andrew
J. Haile, Affiliate Nexus in E-Commerce, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1803, 1806–12 (2012).
13 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088–97.
14 Id. at 2089.
15 Id. at 2088.
6
7
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Quill perpetuated under the dormant Commerce Clause. That rule,
Justice Kennedy wrote, “is not a necessary interpretation” of the
substantial nexus test developed under the dormant Commerce
Clause.16 Moreover, that rule “creates rather than resolves market
distortions”17 and embodies an “arbitrary, formalistic distinction”18
between those types of in-state presence which are deemed to create
substantial nexus with the state and those which are not. “In the
name of federalism and free markets, Quill does harm to both.”19
Third, Justice Kennedy concluded the Court should disregard the
dictates of stare decisis and should itself overturn Quill rather than
rely on Congress to overrule the “unfair and unjust”20 physical
presence rule.21
Concurring with Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, Justice
Thomas reiterated his view that the Court’s dormant Commerce
Clause case law “can no longer be rationally justified.”22 Also
concurring, Justice Gorsuch did not go as far as Justice Thomas but,
in a skeptical vein, noted that the validity of the Court’s dormant
Commerce Clause case law is a “question[ ] for another day.”23
Thus, while Justices Thomas and Gorsuch provided the fourth
and fifth votes in Wayfair, they bottomed their conclusions on
different premises than those embraced by Justice Kennedy. For
Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Alito and Ginsburg) the
dormant Commerce Clause is a legitimate enterprise which went
astray in Quill.24 For Justice Thomas (definitely) and for Justice
Gorsuch (probably), Quill was not simply a mistake, but rather
was the product of the misbegotten project that is the dormant
Commerce Clause.25
As a matter of substance, Chief Justice Roberts was as critical
of the physical presence rule as was Justice Kennedy. On behalf of
himself and three of his colleagues, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that
Bellas Hess, which originally announced the physical presence rule
confirmed in Quill, “was wrongly decided.”26 Consequently, not
a single member of the Wayfair Court concluded that the physical

Id. at 2092.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2096.
Id.
21 Id. at 2096–97.
22 Id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504
U.S. 298, 333 (1992)).
23 Id. at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
24 Id. at 2087, 2097.
25 See id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
26 Id. at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
16
17
18
19
20
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presence rule was appropriate for an economy in which electronic
commerce is now so prominent.
However, the Chief Justice and his three colleagues joining
his Wayfair dissent concluded that Congress, not the Court, was
the appropriate forum for overturning Quill’s rule that a state
can impose sales tax collection responsibilities only on a retailer
with in-state physical presence.27 The revision of this rule, the
Chief Justice argued, “should be undertaken by Congress.”28
Congress, he observed, “has in fact been considering
whether to alter the rule established in Bellas Hess for some
time.”29 “[L]egislators may more directly consider the competing
interests at stake.”30
In sum, Quill reflected three different perspectives among the
Justices of the Court. Four Justices (Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) did not dispute the
fundamental legitimacy of the dormant Commerce Clause or the
unsoundness of the physical presence rule for imposing upon
retailers the obligation to collect state sales taxes.31 However, as a
procedural matter, these four dissenting Justices preferred for
Congress, rather than the Court, to make any changes to the
physical presence rule announced in Bellas Hess and confirmed in
Quill.32 Three members of the Court (Justices Kennedy, Alito, and
Ginsburg) defended the intrinsic validity of the dormant Commerce
Clause, but concluded that Quill and its physical presence rule were
properly overturned by the Court itself.33 Two Justices (Justices
Thomas and Gorsuch) expressed their skepticism about the
dormant Commerce Clause and caused Quill to be overruled by
joining with their three colleagues who, while more positive about
the dormant Commerce Clause, supported Quill’s demise.34 Hence,
Wayfair, by a 5-4 vote, quashed Quill.
III. WYNNE
Similar divisions were evident three years earlier in Wynne,
another 5-4 dormant Commerce Clause decision.35 Wayfair expanded
state authority by abolishing the physical presence rule, thereby
permitting states to impose sales tax collection responsibilities on
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id. at 2102 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2102 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2104 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 2101–05 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 2102–04 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2089–90, 2099.
See id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2100 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1791 (2015).
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out-of-state internet and mail-order retailers that lack in-state
physical presence.36 In contrast, Wynne curbed state taxing authority
by requiring states to grant income tax credits to their residents for
the out-of-state income taxes such residents pay.37
The tax at issue in Wynne was the county income tax imposed
by Maryland law.38 While the Maryland state income tax gave
Maryland residents credits for the income taxes such residents
paid to other states, Maryland did not extend a similar credit
under the Maryland county income tax for out-of-state taxes paid
by Maryland residents.39 For a five Justice majority, Justice Alito
held that this failure to grant residents a county income tax credit
for out-of-state taxes discriminated against interstate commerce in
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.40
The four central themes of Justice Alito’s opinion were the
historic provenance of the dormant Commerce Clause, the analogy
between a tariff and Maryland’s failure to grant Maryland residents
a credit under the Maryland county income tax for out-of-state
taxes, the evils of double state taxation, and the “internal
consistency” test developed under the dormant Commerce Clause.41
Presaging his agreement with Justice Kennedy in Wayfair, Justice
Alito in Wynne embraced the legitimacy of the dormant Commerce
Clause, which “has deep roots.”42 “[A] state tariff,” Justice Alito

See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792. As an alternative to providing its residents with
income tax credits for out-of-state income taxes, a state can comply with Wynne’s
nondiscrimination/internal consistency standard by eschewing the taxation of
nonresidents’ incomes earned within the state. An income tax imposed only on residents
passes the test of internal consistency since, if adopted universally, such a tax only taxes
income once—assuming that taxpayers are residents in only one state. See id. at 1822
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This possibility confirms the point made in the text: Wayfair
expands state tax authority by permitting a state to impose sales tax collection
responsibilities on out-of-state internet sellers. In contrast, Wynne restricts state tax
authority by requiring states to grant credits to their residents for the out-of-state taxes
such residents pay or by abandoning the taxation of nonresidents on the income they earn
in the state.
38 Id. at 1792. For more background on Wynne, see generally Edward A. Zelinsky,
The Enigma of Wynne, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 797 (2016), which discusses the
enigmatic effects of Wynne on future dormant Commerce Clause application, and Brannon
P. Denning, The Dormant Commerce Clause Wynnes Won Wins One: Five Takes on Wynne
and Direct Marketing Association, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 103 (2016), which
compares Wynne to prior case law to help define its scope of impact.
39 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.
40 Id.
41 See id. at 1794–95, 1802, 1804.
42 Id. at 1794. Dissenting in Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 376 (2008),
Justice Alito characterized his position in Davis and in United Haulers Ass’n., Inc.
v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 356 (2007) as “proceed[ing] . . . on the
assumption that the Court's established dormant Commerce Clause precedents should be
followed . . . .” This statement could be interpreted as leaving the door open to a reassessment of
the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause case law. However, Justice Alito’s Wynne opinion and
36
37
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wrote, was “the quintessential evil targeted by the dormant
Commerce Clause.”43 Maryland’s failure to grant residents a credit
for out-of-state taxes “has the same economic effect” as a tariff.44
Maryland’s county income tax flouts the norms of the dormant
Commerce Clause, Justice Alito wrote, because “Maryland’s tax
scheme is inherently discriminatory and operates as a tariff.”45
To advance this characterization, Justice Alito contrasted two
hypothetical residents of a state which provides no credit for
out-of-state taxes.46 In this example, one of these residents earns
all of her income in-state while the other resident earns his income
out-of-state.47 Because the state in which they live provides no
credit for out-of-state taxes, the latter resident pays two state
income taxes on his income, one tax to the state of his residence
and a second tax to the state in which he earns his income.48 On
the other hand, the first resident pays a single state tax on her
income since she earns all of her income in-state.49 Like a tariff,
this encourages residents to generate income at home rather than
out-of-state so as to be taxed only once by the state of residence,
rather than twice by the state of residence and simultaneously by
the second state in which the income is earned.50
According to Justice Alito, a state tax scheme which provides
no credit for the out-of-state taxes paid by residents violated the
dormant Commerce Clause’s internal consistency test.51 Under
this test, the relevant inquiry is what would happen if all states
adopted the tax being challenged under the dormant Commerce
Clause.52 Justice Alito answered that in such a theoretical world
there are effectively state tariffs nationwide so an individual who
ventures to earn out-of-state income in this hypothetical setting
is always double taxed by the two states in which she lives and
works.53 In contrast, an individual who just earns income in her
home state is taxed only once by her state of residence.54 This,
Justice Alito observed, unconstitutionally discriminates against
interstate economic activity.
his support for Justice Kennedy’s Wayfair opinion evince a stronger commitment to the
dormant Commerce Clause.
43 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1804.
46 Id. at 1803–04.
47 Id. at 1803.
48 Id. at 1803–04.
49 Id. at 1804.
50 See id.
51 Id. at 1803.
52 See id. at 1802.
53 Id. at 1804.
54 Id. at 1803–04.
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For himself and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia in Wynne
excoriated the dormant Commerce Clause as “a judge-invented
rule”55 which contrasts with “the real Commerce Clause.”56 The
Commerce Clause, Justice Scalia informed us, is an affirmative
grant of power to Congress, not a license for judges “to set aside
state laws they believe burden commerce.”57 Justice Scalia’s
skepticism of the dormant Commerce Clause led him to conclude
that, “[f]or reasons of stare decisis,”58 he would strike taxes under
the dormant Commerce Clause in only two cases: a state tax
which “discriminates on its face against interstate commerce or
[a tax which] cannot be distinguished from a tax [the] Court has
already held unconstitutional.”59 In contrast, Justice Thomas was
(and is) unwilling to defer to existing dormant Commerce Clause
case law in these two or in any other cases.60
Justice Ginsburg’s Wynne dissent, like Justice Alito’s majority
opinion, accepts the legitimacy of the dormant Commerce Clause.61
However, Justice Ginsburg concluded (joined by Justices Scalia
and Kagan) that Wynne misapplied the dormant Commerce
Clause.62 Since the Wynnes are Maryland residents, Maryland can
tax all of their worldwide income. The dormant Commerce Clause,
Justice Ginsburg maintained, does not require Maryland as a
state of residence to grant Marylanders like the Wynnes a credit
for the out-of-state taxes they pay.63 Such credits for out-of-state
taxes may be wise as a matter of policy. But, Justice Ginsburg
argued, there are competing concerns which justify states taxing
their residents’ incomes without granting credits for the
out-of-state taxes such residents pay: “More is given to the
residents of a [s]tate than to those who reside elsewhere, therefore
more may be demanded of them.”64
Moreover, Maryland residents do not need dormant Commerce
Clause protection from their own state’s tax laws since they
vote for the legislators and governors who tax them. In contrast,
nonresidents need dormant Commerce Clause succor as they do not
vote in the state which taxes them on the income they earn in the
taxing state.65 The majority in Wynne, Justice Ginsburg argued,

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 1807 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1811 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1815 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1814 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1816 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1814 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1814–15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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erroneously constitutionalized “tax policy” better left to “state
legislatures and the Congress.”66
IV. THE FUTURE OF DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE SKEPTICISM
An important takeaway from comparing Wynne and Wayfair
is that the Justices who would abolish the dormant Commerce
Clause are not close to constituting a majority of the Court.
However, in particular cases, these dormant Commerce Clause
skeptics can exercise critical influence on the Court’s decisions.
In Wynne, it was Justices Scalia and Thomas who scorned
the dormant Commerce Clause.67 In Wayfair, Justices Thomas
and Gorsuch played the role of dormant Commerce Clause
skeptics.68 In Wynne, Justices Scalia and Thomas had no impact
on the outcome of the case since five Justices concluded without
them that the dormant Commerce Clause requires Maryland to
provide a credit under its county income tax to Maryland
residents for the out-of-state taxes such residents pay.69 On the
other hand, in Wayfair, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch proved
critical to the Court’s outcome, giving Justice Kennedy the fourth
and fifth votes he needed to overturn Quill.70
Two uncertainties complicate this situation for the future.
First, we do not know whether Justice Kennedy’s successor, Justice
Brett Kavanaugh, will share Justice Kennedy’s commitment to the
dormant Commerce Clause or whether he will align himself with
dormant Commerce Clause skepticism. Second, that skepticism,
Wynne and Wayfair make clear, can come in different forms.
Despite his doubts about the dormant Commerce Clause, Justice
Scalia remained willing to strike taxes under that doctrine in either
of two contexts: When, as a matter of stare decisis, a pending case
was clearly controlled by a prior decision, or when discrimination
against interstate commerce was apparent “on [the] face” of the
challenged state tax.71 An interesting possibility is that, had
Justice Scalia lived, he might, in the interests of stare decisis,
have provided Chief Justice Roberts with the fifth Wayfair vote
for retaining Quill.

See id. at 1823 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); id. at 2100 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
69 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1791.
70 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087.
71 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1811 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66
67
68

2019]

Comparing Wayfair and Wynne

63

Justice Thomas, by contrast, will in all cases refuse to apply the
dormant Commerce Clause.72 Justice Gorsuch’s brief comments in
his Wayfair concurrence73 leave open for him either of these
approaches and perhaps others.
In short, the dormant Commerce Clause enjoys broad support
among the Justices currently serving on the Court. However, in
particular instances, the Justices who are dormant Commerce Clause
skeptics may play a pivotal role.74 Wayfair was such a case.75
V. DOES WAYFAIR OPEN THE FLOODGATES?
Whenever the Court overrules a prominent precedent, the
question arises: What is next? Wayfair makes clear that, in the
dormant Commerce Clause context, the answer is: Not much.
Wayfair does not open the floodgates to revision of the Court’s
dormant Commerce Clause case law.
This conclusion starts with the four Justices who would have
left Quill standing despite the admitted unsuitability of the
physical presence rule in a world of electronic commerce.76 Since
the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause decisions can be revised or
rejected by Congress, Chief Justice Roberts and his dissenting
colleagues contended, the Court should let the Legislative Branch
make whatever changes are required to overturn or modify the
Court’s dormant Commerce Clause case law.77
Moreover, Justice Kennedy made clear that he viewed the
judicial overruling of Quill as uniquely compelling: “Though Quill
was wrong on its own terms when it was decided in 1992, since
then the Internet revolution has made its earlier error all the
more egregious and harmful.”78
This is not an invitation for the Court to engage in wholesale
revision of its dormant Commerce Clause case law. To the
contrary, if it requires something on the order of “the Internet
revolution” to justify overruling a dormant Commerce Clause
precedent, such overruling will be rare.
Only Justice Thomas is committed to a thoroughgoing
repudiation of the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause oeuvre.79
72 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080,
2100 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
73 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2100 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
74 See id. at 2087.
75 See id.
76 See id. at 2101–05 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts was joined by
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. See id.
77 Id. at 2102 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 2097.
79 See id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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As just noted, Justice Gorsuch’s views are still unarticulated and
Justice Kavanaugh, who replaced Justice Kennedy, may or may
not be a dormant Commerce Clause skeptic. But even a dormant
Commerce Clause skeptic can, like Justice Scalia, temper his
opposition to the dormant Commerce Clause with a commitment
to stare decisis.80
Consider in this context Justice Kagan’s positions in Wayfair
and Wynne. In Wayfair, Justice Kagan joined the Chief Justice in
contending that it was better for Congress, rather than the
Court, to overturn or modify the physical presence rule confirmed
in Quill.81 In Wynne, Justice Kagan joined Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent which argued, inter alia, that Mr. and Mrs. Wynne
needed no relief from the Court. 82 As Maryland voters, the
Wynnes had recourse to Maryland’s political process to relieve
them of their double taxation under the Maryland county income
tax. Strong deference to political processes, as manifested by
Justice Kagan’s positions in Wynne and Wayfair, counsels equally
strong respect for precedent since such deference consigns the
task of revising dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to the
political institutions of government.83
VI. TWO ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
A. The Double Taxation of Dual Residents
What are the implications of Wynne and Wayfair for
particular issues the Court is likely to confront in the future? An
important dormant Commerce Clause issue going forward is the
double taxation of dual state residents.84 In an earlier age, it was
mainly very wealthy individuals whose peripatetic lifestyles
caused two or more states to classify them as residents. When
two (or more) states levying personal income taxes both assert
that the same individual is a resident, this dual resident can be
double taxed as both of these states claim the right to tax him on
his worldwide income.85 The double taxation of dual residents is,
in practice, particularly pronounced as to a dual resident’s
80 See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1811 (2015)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
81 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2101–02 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
82 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1816, 1823 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
83 See id. at 1823 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2101–02 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
84 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Double Taxing Dual Residents: A Response to Knoll and
Mason, 86 ST. TAX NOTES 677, 677 (2017) [hereinafter Double Taxing]; Edward A.
Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes to Eliminate the Double Taxation of
Dual Residents: Thoughts Provoked by the Proposed Minnesota Snowbird Tax, 15 FLA.
TAX REV. 533, 534 (2014) [hereinafter Apportioning].
85 See Zelinsky, Apportioning, supra note 84, at 536.
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retirement income (taxed by both states claiming to be a state of
residence)86 and as to a dual resident’s passive investment income,
such as dividends and interests (similarly taxed by both states
claiming to be this individual’s state of residence).87
In the contemporary world, the phenomenon of dual state
residence has spread to two career families maintaining residences in
different states to accommodate both careers.88 Dual state residence
has also spread to “mass affluent” retirees who divide the year
between different homes in different states. In these (and other)
contexts, an individual spends part of the year living in two different
states and thus can be income taxed as a resident by both of them.
It would be best for Congress to eliminate by federal
legislation the double state income taxation of dual state
residents, or for the states themselves to abate the problem of
double taxed dual residents. Absent a political solution enacted
by Congress or negotiated among the states, the courts will find
themselves implored to grant relief from dual residents’ double
state income taxation under the dormant Commerce Clause.89
I favor a political solution to the problem of double taxed
dual residents, either through federal legislation or through
formal or informal arrangements among the states. If there is
to be a judicial resolution of this issue, the dormant Commerce
Clause principle of apportionment is the most compelling of the
tools the courts can employ to eliminate the double taxation of
dual residents.90 Others think that the dormant Commerce
Clause concept of nondiscrimination, and Wynne in particular,
are the appropriate doctrinal handles for convincing the courts to
bar double taxation of dual residents.91

86 4 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2006) (“No State may impose an income tax on any retirement
income of an individual who is not a resident or domiciliary of such State (as determined
under the laws of such State).”).
87 On the principle that intangible investment-based income is taxed by the
taxpayer’s state(s) of residence and the double state taxation of such income when an
individual is a resident for tax purposes of two states, see Zelinsky, Apportioning, supra
note 84, at 541, 548–49, which discusses the principle of mobilia sequuntur personam.
88 Sue Shellenbarger, Work & Family: Marriage From a Distance—More couples are
living apart—here’s what it takes to keep the relationship healthy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15,
2018, at A11 (“[O]f married people living apart . . . . a sizable number do this for work.”).
89 See, e.g., Edelman v. New York State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 80 N.Y.S.3d 241,
243 (App. Div. 2018); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Noto decision and the double state income
taxation of dual residents, OUPBLOG (June 2, 2014), https://blog.oup.com/2014/06/notodecision-double-state-income-taxation/ [http://perma.cc/TN5P-YEAJ].
90 Zelinsky, Double Taxing, supra note 84, at 678; Zelinsky, Apportioning, supra note
84, at 570.
91 See generally Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, New York’s Unconstitutional Tax
Residence Rule, 85 ST. TAX NOTES 707 (2017).
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Wynne indeed reflects a strong aversion to double taxation.
But, as we have just seen, Wynne and Wayfair also reflect
commitments by members of the Court to stare decisis and to
deference to the political process.92 Moreover, the Court has in
the past condoned the double state taxation of dual residents.93
Wynne and Wayfair suggest that the Court will be reluctant to
construe the dormant Commerce Clause to forbid the double
state income taxation of dual residents since this would entail
the Court’s repudiation of long-standing case law condoning such
double taxation.94
Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Kennedy’s successor, could play
a pivotal role in this area. If Justice Kavanaugh is a dormant
Commerce Clause skeptic, it will require near unanimity by the
other six Justices of the Court to apply the dormant Commerce
Clause to bar the double taxation of dual residents. Even if
Justice Kavanaugh adheres to the dormant Commerce Clause,
with Justices Thomas and Gorsuch both leery of the dormant
Commerce Clause, it will require a strong consensus among the
other seven Justices to declare the double taxation of dual
residents unconstitutional. Wynne and Wayfair, both decided 5-4,
indicate that strong consensus is not easily achieved today in the
dormant Commerce Clause context.95
A counterargument is that the Court’s decisions permitting the
double taxation of dual residents—Cory v. White96 and Worcester
County Trust Co. v. Riley97—were decided under the Due Process
Clause. Moreover, these cases involved state-imposed death taxes,
rather than state income taxes. The Court could now possibly hold
that the double taxation of dual residents is forbidden by the
dormant Commerce Clause even though, per these earlier cases, a
double state taxation is permitted as a matter of due process.
Justice Alito did something similar in Wynne when he and four
other Justices held that although the Due Process Clause
permits states to tax all of their residents’ worldwide incomes,
the dormant Commerce Clause does not.98

92 See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1811 (2015)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
93 Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 89 (1982); Worcester Cty. Tr. Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S.
292, 298 (1937).
94 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1811 (Scalia, J., dissenting); South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,
138 S. Ct. 2080, 2101–02 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Worcester Cty. Tr. Co.,
302 U.S. at 299.
95 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087; Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1791.
96 457 U.S. at 89.
97 302 U.S. at 292.
98 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1798–99.
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Alternatively, the Court could conceivably cabin Cory and
Worcester County Trust Co. to their particular facts (i.e., the
double state taxation of dual residents’ estates on their deaths).99
Moreover, the political process analysis is more ambiguous
in the dual resident context than it was in Wynne. That
ambiguity provides a stronger rationale for the judicial protection
of statutory residents since these double-taxed individuals do not
vote in the second state assessing the resident-based income tax
against them. As Justice Ginsburg observed in Wynne,100 the
Wynnes sought tax relief from Maryland where they resided and
voted.101 Double-taxed dual residents are deemed to reside in two
states but can vote in only one of them.
Much dual resident taxation is caused by “statutory residence”
laws102 which classify individuals who spend time in a state without
being domiciled there as residents for state income tax purposes. A
dual state resident will typically vote in the state of her domicile,
thus leaving her without the vote in the state of statutory residence
which imposes a second, residence-based income tax upon her.103
Even if two states both claim to be an individual’s state of
domicile, it is not likely that the individual can or should vote in
both states. And when someone is a statutory resident of two
states, he may vote in neither state because his state of domicile
is a third state.
In the typical dual resident/double taxation situation, an
individual is domiciled in and can vote in only one of the two states
taxing her. This is different than the case of the Wynnes—who
voted in and were taxed by Maryland—since a double taxed dual
resident lacks the ability to vote in at least one of the states taxing
her as a resident.
Voting of course is not the only form of political voice. A
statutory resident can make political contributions in her state of
statutory residence even if she cannot vote in that state because
she is not domiciled there. Nevertheless, the political process
concerns advanced by Justice Ginsburg in Wynne—the Wynnes
were Maryland voters104—do not carry over to the double taxed
dual resident who does not vote in her state of statutory
See Cory, 457 U.S. at 86; Worcester Cty. Tr. Co., 302 U.S. at 294.
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1813–15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 1814–15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
102 Edward A. Zelinsky, Defining Residence for Income Tax Purposes: Domicile as
Gap-Filler, Citizenship as Proxy and Gap-Filler, 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 271, 274–75 (2017);
Zelinsky, Apportioning, supra note 84, at 541–45.
103 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-1-25(A) (2011) (stating that for voting purposes, “[a]
person’s residence is his domicile”).
104 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1814–15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
99
100
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residence. Moreover, unlike the subject of internet sales taxation,
which was a topic of substantial congressional debate,105 Congress
has given virtually no attention to the problem of double taxed
dual state residents.
Considering the counterarguments, Wayfair and Wynne, on
balance, indicate that those favoring the Court’s intervention to stop
the double state income taxation of dual residents face an uphill
fight. Long-standing precedents approve double taxation when two
states both claim to be the taxpayer’s home state for tax
purposes.106 In certain contexts, some Justices conclude that
individuals with political remedies do not need the protection of the
dormant Commerce Clause.107 Dual residents typically vote in the
state of domicile, which is one of the states taxing them on their
worldwide incomes. The Justices who are dormant Commerce
Clause skeptics will not extend that doctrine to protect double-taxed
dual residents. Consequently, those trying to convince the Court to
stop such double taxation via the dormant Commerce Clause face a
daunting challenge.
B. Sourcing Nonresidents’ Incomes: The Case of Employer
Convenience
A second important dormant Commerce Clause issue for the
future is the proper apportionment of individuals’ nonresident
incomes for those who work in multiple states. Like the sales tax
controversy in Wayfair, this issue involves the adaption of older legal
doctrines to the imperatives of modern technology. Particularly
salient in this context is New York’s so-called “convenience of the
employer” test which has been used by the Empire State to tax
nonresident telecommuters on the income they earn while working at
their out-of-state homes.108
As Justice Ginsburg observed in her Wynne dissent, the
states’ jurisdiction to tax individual incomes rests on the concepts
of residence and source.109 A state of residence can exercise a
form of in personam jurisdiction over an individual and, on that
basis, can tax his entire worldwide income.110 In contrast, a
state of source can tax a nonresident’s income on an in rem
basis, that is, because the income arises within the state
even though the nonresident/taxpayer does not live there.
105 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2087, 2102 (2018) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); see also Zelinsky, supra note 12, at 1189, 1197–98.
106 See Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 89 (1982).
107 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1813–17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
108 See Zelinsky, supra note 7, at 1.
109 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1813–17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 1814.
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Source-based jurisdiction is limited to the income a nonresident
earns within the taxing state.
In Wynne, Maryland taxed all of the Wynnes’ income since
the Wynnes were Maryland residents.111 Many other states also
taxed the income the Wynnes earned within those states since
those states were the geographic settings within which the
Wynnes earned such income.112 In Wynne, there was no difficulty
deciding which income was earned in which state of source.
However, modern technology often makes the source of
income a contested question. In particular, modern technology
permits what is sometimes labeled “telecommuting,” in which an
individual works from home for an employer located in another
state.113 Nonresident states can be overly-aggressive in asserting
their ability to tax income on the basis of alleged source-based
jurisdiction. New York’s “convenience of the employer” doctrine is
the paradigmatic instance of such overreaching.114
Consider a law professor who lives in Connecticut and
teaches in New York.115 On some days, he commutes to New York
where he teaches classes and meets with students and
colleagues.116 On the other days of the week, he works at home
doing research and scholarship as well as grading papers and
exams. Modern technology facilities these work-at-home days, by
giving the professor access to legal databases for his research and
by allowing him to stay in touch with his students and colleagues
through email or other electronic forms of communication.
Connecticut taxes all of this professor’s income on the ground
that he is a Connecticut resident.117 New York also taxes all of
this nonresident professor’s income on the theory that the

Id. at 1793.
See id.
Andrea Loubier, Benefits of Telecommuting for the Future of Work, FORBES (July
20, 2017, 11:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrealoubier/2017/07/20/benefits-oftelecommuting-for-the-future-of-work/#7aecd0c516c6 [http://perma.cc/P5DB-5H4W].
114 Edward A. Zelinsky, Pass the Multi-State Worker Act Also, 80 ST. TAX NOTES 719,
720 (2016); Morgan L. Holcomb, Tax My Ride: Taxing Commuters in our National
Economy, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 885, 922 (2008).
115 See In re Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 843–44 (N.Y.
2003). On Zelinsky, telecommuting, and New York’s “convenience of the employer”
rule, see WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND L OCAL T AXATION : CASES AND
MATERIALS 399–401 (10th ed. 2014).
116 See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 843–44.
117 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-701(a)(8) (2018) (“‘Connecticut taxable income of a
resident’ means the Connecticut adjusted gross income of a natural person . . . .”); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 12-701(a)(20) (2018) (“‘Connecticut adjusted gross income’ means adjusted
gross income . . . .”).
111
112
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professor’s days worked at home in Connecticut are not for the
employer’s convenience but are for the professor’s lifestyle.118
Connecticut gives a credit against its income taxes for the
New York taxes the professor pays with respect to the income
allocable to the days he teaches in New York.119 However,
Connecticut (like most other states) will not grant a credit for the
taxes New York assesses on the days the professor works at
home in Connecticut, researching, writing, and grading.120
The net result is double taxation of the portion of the
professor’s income allocable to the days he works at home in
Connecticut. New York taxes this nonresident income even though,
on these days, the professor, a Connecticut resident, works at home
and receives his public services from the Nutmeg State. Connecticut
taxes all of the professor’s income, grants a credit for the New York
taxes allocable to the professor’s days spent in New York, but grants
no credit for the New York taxes attributable to the income earned
on the professor’s days working at home in Connecticut.121
Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey,122 critical to Justice
Alito’s opinion in Wynne,123 indicates that under the dormant
Commerce Clause New York cannot tax income earned outside
its borders—such as the income the professor is paid for
researching, writing, and grading while at home in Connecticut.124
A nonresident telecommuter working at his out-of-state home is
analogous to the bus in Central Greyhound, not taxable by the
Empire State while the bus traversed the roads of Pennsylvania
and New Jersey.125
Given the rise of work patterns denoted as telecommuting,
the Court should address the import of Central Greyhound and
the dormant Commerce Clause concept of apportionment in a
world of telecommuting. States should only tax nonresidents on
income they earn within the state, not income residents earn
when they work at their out-of-state homes. Critical to this
conclusion is the dormant Commerce Clause concept the Court
has called “external consistency,” i.e., that state tax policies

See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 844–45, 848.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-704(a)(1) (2018).
See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 849 (“[I]t is Connecticut’s refusal to provide a credit to
its resident for all of the nonresident income tax that the taxpayer paid to New York that
has created the threat of double taxation.”).
121 Id. at 849.
122 Cent. Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
123 See generally Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
124 See Cent. Greyhound, 334 U.S. at 660–63.
125 See id. at 660–64.
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must, in practice, apportion their tax bases to reflect accurately
where income is earned.126
As a counterargument, Wynne could be read as requiring
Connecticut, as the state of residence, to grant a credit for the
New York taxes assessed on this professor’s work-at-home days.
This, however, is the less persuasive reading of Wynne. Wynne
required Maryland, as the Wynnes’ state of residence, to avoid the
implicit tariff of double taxation.127 In particular, Wynne held that
Maryland’s county income “tax unconstitutionally discriminates
against interstate commerce” because that tax failed to grant a
credit for taxes imposed by other states on the income the Wynnes
earned in those other states.128
However, Connecticut grants a credit to its residents for the
income they earn in New York and other states.129 Connecticut
(like most other states) does not grant credits for taxes imposed by
other states on income earned in Connecticut.130 Thus, the double
taxation under New York’s so-called “convenience of the employer”
doctrine stems, not from the resident state’s refusal to grant a
credit, but from the nonresident state’s refusal to properly
apportion and only tax the income earned within its boundaries.
Consequently, the Court’s concern about double taxation
manifested in Wynne should lead to the application of Central
Greyhound and the external consistency test to the world of
telecommuting. States like New York should only tax nonresident
individuals on the income they earn in New York, not the income
such individuals earn working at their out-of-state homes.
Political process concerns reinforce this conclusion. Like
statutory residents, nonresidents do not vote in the states which
tax them on a source basis. Aggressive practices, like New York’s
convenience of the employer doctrine, export New York’s tax burdens
onto nonvoting, nonresidents. This is an instance of political
dysfunction, precisely the situation where the case for applying the
dormant Commerce Clause is most compelling.
VII. CONCLUSION
A comparison of Wayfair and Wynne indicates that the Court
is unlikely to abandon the dormant Commerce Clause altogether.
However, the Justices who would forsake the dormant Commerce
126 Zelinsky, supra note 38, at 808–10 (discussing the future of external consistency
after Wynne).
127 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.
128 Id. at 1797.
129 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-704(a)(1) (2008).
130 See In re Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 849 (N.Y. 2003).
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Clause can exercise critical influence in specific cases as they did
in Wayfair.131 While Wayfair overturned Quill, Wayfair indicates
that the Court is reluctant to overrule its dormant Commerce
Clause cases.132 On the other hand, when neither the Court nor
Congress has spoken on a particular issue, the Court will consider
significant extensions of the dormant Commerce Clause as it did
in Wynne.133
Wayfair and Wynne suggest that, despite the persuasive
arguments against the double state taxation of dual residents’
incomes, the Court will be reluctant to overturn its long-standing
precedents upholding the double state taxation of dual residents.
The Court is more likely to extend dormant Commerce Clause
protection when states are overly-aggressive in taxing the
incomes of nonresidents such as New York’s “convenience of the
employer” doctrine.

131 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring);
id. at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
132 See id. at 2102 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
133 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1797.

